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Restraint of Statehood and the Quality of Governance by Multinational Companies in Sub-
Saharan Africa
Jana Hönke and Tanja A. Börzel
Abstract:
This paper explores to what extent the quality of governance by MNC in areas of limited 
statehood depends on the limitation, and, more importantly, on the restraint of statehood. 
The control over the monopoly of force and a minimum of state capacity to set and enforce 
rules are only one condition among others facilitating inclusive governance contributions. 
Largely overlooked so far is that state actors (or other local authorities) need to be checked and 
held accountable in order to ensure a certain quality of business contributions to governance. 
To develop this argument, we introduce the concept of quality of business contributions to 
governance and discuss to what extent limited and restrained statehood accounts for the 
substantial variation in quality observed empirically. Based on a discussion of the ambivalent 
role of statehood for governance by non-state actors, we conceptualize restraints on statehood 
as a scope condition for the quality of business contributions to local governance. In addition to 
institutional restraints drawn from liberal state and democratic theory, such as the rule of law and 
elections, we consider societal mechanisms of restraint at the local level, such as embeddedness 
in societal institutions and community pressure. Empirically, we explore our argument and the 
power of these various mechanisms of restraint in case studies of mining companies in Sub-
Saharan Africa and explore gold mining companies in Tanzania in more detail.
Zusammenfassung:
Dieses Arbeitspapier untersucht inwiefern die Qualität von Governance-Leistungen durch 
multinationale Unternehmen in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit von der Begrenzung und 
Gebundenheit des Staates abhängig ist. Wir argumentieren dass die Kontrolle über das 
Gewaltmonopol und ein Minimum staatlicher Kapazität zur Festlegung und Durchsetzung 
von Regeln nur einen möglichen Faktor darstellen der die inklusive Bereitstellung kollektiver  
Güter begünstigt. Dagegen wurde bisher übersehen dass staatliche Akteure (oder andere 
lokale Autoritäten) kontrolliert und sich zur Rechenschaft in Bezug auf das Gemeinwohl 
ZIVTïMGLXIXJ¿LPIRQ¿WWIRYQIMRIFIWXMQQXI5YEPMX§XERYRXIVRILQIVMWGLIR+SZIVRERGI
Beiträgen zu gewährleisten. Zur Erörterung unserer These stellen wir das Konzept der Qualität 
unternehmerischer Governance-Leistungen vor und diskutieren, inwiefern die Begrenzung 
und Gebundenheit von Staatlichkeit Unterschiede in der Qualität unternehmerischer 
Governance-leistungen erklären. Auf der Gundlage einer Auseinandersetzung mit der 
ambivalenten Rolle von Staatlichkeit für Governance durch nicht-staatliche Akteure 
konzeptualisieren wir die Gebundenheit von Staatlichkeit als Rahmenbedingung für die 
Qualität unternehmerischer Governance-Beiträge. Neben der institutionellen Gebundenheit, 
wie Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Wahlen, auf die liberale Staats- und Demokratietheorie verweisen, 
untersuchen wir zudem gesellschaftliche Mechanismen, die zur Gebundenheit auf lokaler 
Ebene führen, wie die Einbindung von Akteuren in soziale Institutionen und kollektiv 
ausgeübter Druck. Empirisch untersuchen wir unsere These anhand von Fallstudien zu 
Bergbauunternehmen in Subsahara-Afrika und insbesondere in Tansania.
6IWXVEMRXSJ7XEXILSSHERHXLI5YEPMX]SJ+SZIVRERGIF]1YPXMREXMSREP'SQTERMIWMR7YF7ELEVER%JVMGE`
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the debate over whether and how business contributes to governance. 
We are concerned with potential contributions of multinational companies (MNCs) to the 
provision of health care, education or security in the particular context of areas of limited 
statehood, with a focus on the quality of such contributions. In areas of limited statehood, 
the state does not hold the monopoly over the legitimate use of force and/or has only limited 
capacities to set and enforce rules. Rather than treating MNC as problem or cure, the governance 
literature has increasingly explored conditions under which companies may indeed contribute 
to the provision of collective goods and services, aka governance. However, these studies have 
so far mainly focused on whether companies commit to voluntary standards and contribute to 
governance at all. We contend that it is also essential to look at the quality of such contributions.
This paper investigates to what extent the quality of governance by MNC in areas of limited 
statehood depends on the limitation, and, more importantly, on the restraint of statehood. We 
argue that (local) control over the monopoly of force and a minimum of state capacity to set and 
enforce rules are at best a necessary condition in this regard. The power and capacity of state 
actors have to be checked and controlled to ensure a certain quality of business contributions 
to governance.
7RGHYHORSWKLVDUJXPHQWZHíUVWLQWURGXFHWKHFRQFHSWRITXDOLW\RIEXVLQHVVFRQWULEXWLRQVWR
governance and distinguish three dimensions along which variation in quality can be assessed. 
We then discuss to what extent limited and restrained statehood may account for such variation. 
Based on a discussion of the ambivalent role of statehood for governance by non-state actors, 
we conceptualize restraints on state power and capacity as a scope condition for the quality of 
business contributions to local governance. In addition to institutional restraints drawn from 
liberal state and democratic theory, such as the rule of law and elections, we consider societal 
mechanisms of restraint that might hold authorities accountable to some public good and 
thereby improve the quality of business contributions to governance at the local level. 
The empirical part of the paper explores the explanatory power of our argument with the help 
of case studies conducted on the role of mining companies in local governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.1 The cases vary with regards to the limitation and, more importantly, the restraint of 
VWDWHKRRG$IWHUEULHî\DVVHVVLQJWKHOLQNEHWZHHQIRUPDOUHVWUDLQWVRIVWDWHKRRGDQGWKHTXDOLW\
of business governance contributions at national level, we focus on the case of gold mining 
companies in Tanzania. Under conditions of a medium degree of both limited and restraint 
1 This paper presents results of the research project Business and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is part of the Collaborative Research Center 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”, 
funded by the German Research Foundation (SFB 700) cf. http://www.sfb-governance.de/. We thank 
Esther Thomas for her substantial contribution to data collection in Tanzania and for comments on 
a previous version of this paper. We also thank Nadine Zillich, Laura Herzog and Miriam Weihe for 
excellent research assistance. Finally, we are grateful to Deborah Avant for her excellent comments 
on a previous version of this paper presented at the International Studies Association meeting in San 
Francisco, April 3-6, 2013.
6IWXVEMRXSJ7XEXILSSHERHXLI5YEPMX]SJ+SZIVRERGIF]1YPXMREXMSREP'SQTERMIWMR7YF7ELEVER%JVMGE`
statehood at national level, we illustrate how variation in local restraint of statehood accounts 
IRUWKHGLìHULQJTXDOLW\RIEXVLQHVVFRQWULEXWLRQVWRORFDOJRYHUQDQFH
2. Business contributions to governance, limited statehood and functional equivalents 
7KH JRYHUQDQFH OLWHUDWXUH KDV LGHQWLíHG WKH WKUHDW RI VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ DV D NH\ LQFHQWLYH
for non-state actors to engage in governance. This so-called ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is not 
only required to make self-interested non-state actors voluntarily commit to the provision 
of collective goods and services; it also ensures that, on the one hand, they honor their 
FRPPLWPHQWDQGRQWKHRWKHUWKDWWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLUJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVDWLVíHVWKH
public rather than their own private interest (cf. Scharpf 1997; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). The 
VKDGRZRIKLHUDUFK\LVJHQHUDWHGE\VWDWHKRRGGHíQHGDVWKHFDSDFLW\RIVWDWHDFWRUVWRFUHGLEO\
threaten the unilateral adoption and enforcement of collectively binding rules on the provision 
of common goods and their unilateral provision, respectively (Börzel 2010). The threat of state 
intervention has been found particularly important for inducing governance contributions 
of companies, professional associations, pressure groups or consultancies. Unlike state actors 
DQG QRWIRUSURíW RUJDQL]DWLRQV HJ SXEOLF LQWHUHVW JURXSV WKHVH DFWRUV DUH QRW REOLJDWHG
by formal institutions or social norms to pursue the common good.2 With the emergence of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), business has increasingly committed itself voluntarily to 
complying with human rights, social and environmental standards. However, it is economic and 
reputational concerns that motivate such behavior. If their voluntary governance contributions 
GRQRWSD\RìFRPSDQLHVDUHOLNHO\WRUHQHJHRQWKHLUFRPPLWPHQWV%¸U]HODQG7KDXHU
$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHUHLVQRV\VWHPDWLFOLQNEHWZHHQGLìHUHQWGHJUHHVRIOLPLWHGVWDWHKRRG
and the extent of non-state actors’ contributions to governance. In so called “areas of limited 
statehood”, which include large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the state is often too weak and 
unwilling to set and enforce regulation aimed at the provision of collective goods and services 
and the direct delivery of collective goods and services (cf. Risse 2011). The state is also not 
capable of casting a shadow of hierarchy by making credible regulatory threats. However, the 
mutual relationship between limited statehood and governance contributions by business is 
not necessarily negative. On the one hand, companies which operate in areas with very limited 
or no statehood, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), still make attempts to 
contribute to local governance, whereas other companies do not (Börzel, Hönke and Thauer 
2012; Börzel and Hönke 2012; Hönke and Thauer 2014). On the other hand, highly capable 
states might not be willing to set and enforce rules for extended governance contributions 
by companies. China, for instance, has the capacity to set and enforce higher environmental 
VWDQGDUGVIRUíUPVEXWLWRIWHQFKRRVHVQRWWRGRVR7KHVDPHLVWUXHIRUDQXPEHURIVWDWHVLQ
the United States, which are theoretically able to enforce stricter environmental standards on 
2 This is not to say that state actors are motivated to pursue the common good and always do so. But 
unlike business or interest groups, most governments (and non-governmental organizations) can be 
held accountable and will face legal and/or social sanctions if they abuse their legal or moral authority 
to pursue private self-interests.
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íUPVEXWKDYHGHFLGHGDJDLQVWLW,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHJRYHUQDQFHEHKDYLRURIFRPSDQLHVYDULHV
ZLWKLQFRQWH[WVRIGLìHUHQWGHJUHHVRIVWDWHKRRG
In our previous work, we have argued that a number of factors besides the shadow of hierarchy 
account for such variation. There are several functional equivalents to the threat of public 
regulation that can equally induce MNC and other non-state actors in areas of limited statehood 
to provide collective goods and services (Börzel and Risse 2010; Börzel, Hönke and Thauer 
2012). We have shown that the risk of anarchy (absence of any state governance), the threat of 
H[WHUQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQWKHSUHVVXUHVRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUORFDOFRPPXQLW\RUHïFLHQF\JDLQV
and competitive (dis)advantages provide important incentives to engage in governance, even 
LQDUHDVZKHUH WKHVWDWH LVQRWFDSDEOHRUQRWZLOOLQJWRHQIRUFHHìHFWLYHUHJXODWLRQRI WKHLU
activities (Börzel, Hönke and Thauer 2012, Börzel and Thauer 2013; Börzel and Hamann 2013, cf. 
3UDNDVKDQG3RWRVNL'HLWHOKRìDQG:ROI
We have also shown that highly limited statehood can encourage rather than impair company 
contributions to governance. Governments outsource local governance to companies in areas 
of limited statehood in order to use business governance contributions to regain or strengthen 
control over regions and revenues. Through strategic absence, host states “indirectly discharge” 
WKHPDQDJHPHQWRIORFDOJULHYDQFHVDQGFRQîLFWWRFRPSDQLHVVXFKDVLQPLQLQJUHJLRQVLQ
southern and eastern DRC (Hönke 2010; Hönke 2013b).
In sum, limited statehood – the level of capacities to set and enforce rules by (state) authorities – 
is not systematically related to whether companies engage in local governance. However, there 
LVPRUHWRVWDWHKRRGDQGLWVHìHFWRQWKHUROHRIEXVLQHVVLQORFDOJRYHUQDQFH:HLQWURGXFH
WZRFRQFHSWVLQWKLVUHVSHFWíUVWWKHTXDOLWLHVRIEXVLQHVVFRQWULEXWLRQVWRORFDOJRYHUQDQFH
and second, the restraint of statehood as a factor that accounts for variation in the quality of 
governance outcomes. 
$VIRUWKHíUVWFRQFHSWZHDUJXHWKDWZHQHHGWRPRYHEH\RQGWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHQFRPSDQLHV
HQJDJHLQWKHSURYLVLRQRIFROOHFWLYHJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVDQGLQVWHDGIRFXVRQWKHGLìHUHQFHV
in quality of such non-state governance. Most companies provide club rather than public 
goods, and there is enormous variation in how comprehensive and inclusive their governance 
contributions are (see below, cf. Hönke 2013a; Thauer 2013). This brings us to the second 
question: to what extent is statehood still important in order to understand variation in the 
quality of business governance? 
3. The quality of MNC contributions to local governance 
What is still neglected in the growing literature on governance by business is discussion on the 
quality of its governance contributions. Many larger MNCs now refer to the CSR discourse and 
commit to at least certain voluntary standards. However, existing works usually do not consider 
ZKRDQGKRZPDQ\DFWXDOO\EHQHíWIURPVXFKFRPPLWPHQWVDWWKHORFDOOHYHO9DULDWLRQLQWKH
quality of company contributions to governance is substantial. We thus need to distinguish 
6IWXVEMRXSJ7XEXILSSHERHXLI5YEPMX]SJ+SZIVRERGIF]1YPXMREXMSREP'SQTERMIWMR7YF7ELEVER%JVMGE`
GLìHUHQWVFRSHDQGLQFOXVLYHQHVVRIFRPSDQLHVØJRYHUQDQFHDWWHPSWV,QDGGLWLRQLWVKRXOGQRW
be ignored how companies attempting to “do good” may actually produce serious negative side 
HìHFWV)LQDOO\ZHVXJJHVWRYHUFRPLQJWKHLVRODWHGVWXG\RIVSHFLíFFRPSDQ\SURJUDPVWKDW
contribute to collective goods and services and instead assessing such programs in light of the 
negative externalities of a company’s business practices. In our previous work, we developed 
DQDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUNIRUGLVWLQJXLVKLQJGLìHUHQWTXDOLWLHVRIJRYHUQDQFHDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
IROORZLQJ WKUHHGLìHUHQWGLPHQVLRQV VFRSHLQFOXVLYHQHVV WKH LQGLUHFWHìHFWVRIJRYHUQDQFH
and the way governance contributions compare to the externalities of core business practices 
(Hönke, with Thomas 2012).
Firstly, two measures of how inclusive governance is stand out, namely the claimed and the 
actual scope of collective goods provision by an actor. Scope refers to both geographical 
and social reach: which geographical areas are addressed, and where is governance actually 
LPSOHPHQWHG":KR LV DGGUHVVHGE\ JRYHUQDQFH DQGZKR DFWXDOO\ UHFHLYHV RU EHQHíWV IURP
governance? Social and geographical in/exclusion do not always go hand in hand, and this 
needs to be analytically distinguished (Rose 1999). A company may score highly in terms of 
the addressees and areas targeted by governance attempts on paper, yet score much lower 
when it comes to the actual implementation of such policies. In addition to criteria for the 
scope of governance contributions, we suggest an examination of the perception of governance 
(e.g. Cammett/MacLean 2011: 9). How do people evaluate the type and quality of governance 
contributions by a company? Is their scope and social distribution considered broad and fair, 
or narrow, unequal or exclusionary (Hönke, with Thomas 2012: 9-13)?
Figure 1: Inclusiveness of governance by companies (Hönke, with Thomas 2012: 13)
The geographical scope of governance  The social scope of governance
Designated area Actual spatial reach Addressees Actual recipients 
Qualitative experience of governance 
Perceived as inclusive and equal or as exclusive and unequal
6HFRQGJRYHUQDQFHLQLWLDWLYHVKDYHXQLQWHQGHGSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHHìHFWVWKDWQHHGWREH
taken into account in order to evaluate their quality. The governance literature deals with 
the non-compliance of companies with voluntary standards, but there is very little about the 
“unintended” consequences of governance (for an exception, see Daase/Friesendorf 2010). Yet 
JRYHUQDQFHIRUDSDUWLFXODUFROOHFWLYLW\RULQDVSHFLíFIXQFWLRQDODUHDPD\LQGLUHFWO\EHQHíW
RUZRUNDJDLQVWRWKHUV2YHUDOODÚàQDUURZIRFXV>à@RQVSHFLíFJRYHUQDQFHSUREOHPVPD\EH
EHQHíFLDOLQWHUPVRIVLPSOHSHUIRUPDQFHEXWFRXOGSURYRNHQHJDWLYHVLGHHìHFWVDQGWKXV
FRXOGEHG\VIXQFWLRQDOLQWHUPVRIFRPSOH[SHUIRUPDQFHÛ6FK¦IHUKRìHWDO
:H IRFXVRQ WZRDVSHFWVKHUH)LUVW FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDWWHPSWVPD\DìHFW ORFDOSROLWLFV
by upholding, helping to install or destabilizing narrow ruling coalitions. Hence they may 
perpetuate entrenched inequalities and domination or help to overcome them. This can be 
observed by looking at change/non-change in the nature of ruling coalitions and the degree of 
SFB-Governance;SVOMRK4ETIV7IVMIWà2Sà(IGIQFIV`
participation in and leverage of the local population in decision making. Second, governance in 
DSDUWLFXODULVVXHDUHDIRUDSDUWLFXODUJURXSFDQLQFUHDVHFRQîLFWZLWKRWKHUJURXSV(VSHFLDOO\
in the sensitive area of security, narrow security provision for the few – often the company and a 
number of local collaborators – increases insecurity for many, usually for the more marginalized 
and less powerful parts of the local population (Hönke, with Thomas 2012, pp. 9-12). This can 
be measured in terms of reported violent encounters between people who are not addressed 
DVEHQHíFLDULHVRIDJRYHUQDQFHLQLWLDWLYHDQGVHFXULW\IRUFHVLPSOHPHQWLQJWKDWLQLWLDWLYH2QH
FDQDOVRREVHUYHZKHWKHUPRUHSHRSOHEHQHíWHGIURPDVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQWKDQWKRVHDGGUHVVHG
E\WKHLQLWLDWLYHLQWKHíUVWSODFH2YHUDOOORRNLQJDWLQGLUHFWHìHFWVRIJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQV
JRHVEH\RQGWKHVWXG\RILPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISROLFLHVWRHQFRPSDVVSUDFWLFDOHìHFWVDQGSROLWLFDO
G\QDPLFVWKDWXQIROGDURXQG01&SURJUDPV,WWDNHVLQWRDFFRXQWUHVHDUFKíQGLQJVIURPRWKHU
íHOGVLQZKLFKWKHUHDUHDPSOHHYLGHQFHIRUKRZH[WHUQDOJRYHUQDQFHRIWHQSHUSHWXDWHVRUHYHQ
aggravates, social and political inequality (see for instance the literature on the anthropology of 
development, such as Mosse and Lewis 2005). 
)LJXUH8QLQWHQGHGHìHFWVRIJRYHUQDQFH$GDSWHGIURP+¸QNHZLWK7KRPDV
Local politics: bring into place, perpetuate or challenge narrow ruling coalitions and 
inequalities
Local (in)security
Increased insecurity for non-members 
of the “club”
,QFUHDVHGFRQîLFWEHWZHHQJURXSV
Finally, contributions to governance by companies in one area need to be considered in light 
of negative externalities of other core business practices of a company. This is an important 
contribution to business and governance literature that has tended to focus on positive examples 
RIJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVE\FRPSDQLHV+DXîHU'HLWHOKRIDQG:ROI\HWLVRODWHV
these from the negative externalities of other, core business activities (Hönke 2013b; Börzel and 
+¸QNHDOVR9RJHO1HJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHVDUHGHíQHGDVWKHVSLOORYHURIWKHFRVWVRI
an economic activity to unrelated third parties. For mining companies, typical examples for 
such negative externalities are serious environmental, such as polluted water, water scarcity, the 
ORVVRIDJULFXOWXUDOODQGRUGXVW7KHUHQWLHUOLWHUDWXUHGLUHFWVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHQHJDWLYHHìHFWV
mining companies often have on government performance and accountablitiy (e.g., Ross 1999, 
Reno 2001). In the case of security, companies may help to uphold stability in an area. However, 
asset protection is about security as a private good, and hence related security measures often 
impact negatively on public security in an area. Indicators for such decrease in public security 
DUH URDGV DQG íHOGV UHQGHUHG LQDFFHVVLEOH EHFDXVH RI SDWUROV DQG URDG EORFNDJHV LQFUHDVH
in violent encounters between local residents and security forces; loss of local livelihood 
opportunities due to, for instance, loss of land and/or access to artisanal mining opportunity or 
alternative means of generating income. Overall, local governance contributions by companies 
6IWXVEMRXSJ7XEXILSSHERHXLI5YEPMX]SJ+SZIVRERGIF]1YPXMREXMSREP'SQTERMIWMR7YF7ELEVER%JVMGE`
need to be evaluated as to whether they properly reduce or compensate for negative externalities 
caused by the same company.
)LJXUH([WHUQDOLWLHVRIFRUHEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHV$GDSWHGIURP+¸QNHZLWK7KRPDV
Politics: strengthen narrow ruling coalitions, decrease accountability
(In)Security: increase security or increased violent encounters with security forces and 
human insecurity
Measured according to these three criteria, the quality of MNC contributions to security 
JRYHUQDQFHYDULHVVLJQLíFDQWO\EHWZHHQRXUFDVHVZLWKLQDQGDFURVVFRXQWULHV:HVXJJHVWWKDW
the restraint of statehood accounts for this variation to an important extent. The next section 
therefore introduces the concept of restraint of statehood and how it relates to the quality of 
companies’ governance contributions.
4. Beyond limited statehood. Institutional restraints of state power and alternative 
accountability mechanisms
There is more to statehood than generating incentives for non-state actors to engage in 
governance. It has been suggested, for instance, that, in certain cases in which non-state actors 
DWWHPSW WRFRQWULEXWH WRFROOHFWLYHJRRGVSURYLVLRQ WKH\íUVW UHTXLUH WKHSURYLVLRQRI VRPH
(basic) common goods, such as political stability and security (cf. Beisheim et al. 2011). The 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIFRPSOH[WDVNVVXFKDVWKHFRPEDWRI+,9$,'6RUWKHSURYLVLRQRISXEOLF
security, requires a basic institutional infrastructure to make governance activities of MNC and 
RWKHUH[WHUQDODFWRUVHìHFWLYH%¸U]HOHWDO6FK¦IHUKRì.UDVQHUDQG5LVVH7KLV
infrastructure is usually provided by the state. Yet, other authority structures and collective 
institutions might be able to provide them as well (Menkhaus 2007; Draude 2012).
Moreover, the literature still tends to emphasize how statehood is necessary for the provision 
of collective goods and services. The assumption is that political authorities have a rational 
interest in collective goods provision by non-state actors because they themselves are too weak 
to do so (Börzel 2010). State actors enlist the help of non-state actors to increase their control 
over a particular area in which they lack the capacities to assert their authority (Hönke 2010) or 
to build support from and trust among the electorate (Putnam 1993; Tsai 2011). 
What is often neglected in these considerations is that statehood can also undermine the 
provision of collective goods and services by non-state actors. Existing state capacities are not 
necessarily employed to cast a shadow of hierarchy over, or assist, non-state actors to contribute 
WRJRYHUQDQFH,QIDFWVWDWHKRRGFDQKDYHDQHJDWLYHHìHFWRQWKHJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVRI
non-state actors if state actors lack the political will, rather than the administrative capacities 
LQWKHíUVWSODFHWRSURYLGHLQFHQWLYHVRUEDVLFLQIUDVWUXFWXUH3 
3 On the following see also Börzel, Hönke and Thauer 2012.
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4.1 ‘Dark sides’ of statehood
State actors often lack autonomy from business (Evans 1989; Handley 2008) and reduce regulatory 
DQGWD[UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUíUPV&RQYHUVHO\WKH\PD\DVNIRUSULYDWHEHQHíWVDWWKHH[SHQVHRI
the broader public good. They can (ab)use their legal authority to impose their political and 
HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV RQ íUPV REVWUXFWLQJ JRYHUQDQFH FRQWULEXWLRQV LQ SDUWLFXODU DUHDV RU
LQîXHQFLQJDFWXDOO\QDUURZLQJWKHVFRSHRIDSURJUDPWRPDNHLWEHQHíWDVSHFLíFFOLHQWHO
MNC often rely on informal political networks to receive state contracts and licenses. They 
then grant members of these networks personal favours (Hönke 2013b; Reno 2001). In the past, 
the South African government has, for instance, gone beyond refusing support for and trying 
WRWDNHFRQWURORIEXVLQHVVLQLWLDWLYHVWRíJKW+,9$,'6EHFDXVHRIQRUPDWLYHGLVDJUHHPHQW
Local government actors sought to capture business workplace programs to enroll their own 
public employees in return for taking over former business employees into the public health 
VHUYLFH7KDXHU%¸U]HOHWDO7KHVHGLìHUHQWG\QDPLFVFDQUHGXFHWKHTXDOLW\DQG
HìHFWLYHQHVVRIJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVE\íUPV
State actors may also refuse to provide companies with the necessary support for contributing to 
JRYHUQDQFHIHDULQJ×DJHQF\ORVVØRU×DJHQF\FDSWXUHØEHFDXVHRIWKHLQIHULRULW\RIWKHLUíQDQFLDO
resources, personnel and expertise (Stigler 1971; Hellmann et al. 2002). They may also prevent 
companies from providing a particular collective good or service and obstruct their governance 
contributions if these contributions address issue areas in a way not supported by government. 
One important factor here is legitimacy. If a company’s attempt to engage in governance is 
considered illegitimate by a host authority, due to an incongruence of norms, states – even with 
very limited overall capacities to govern – can prevent such governance contributions (Hönke 
and Thauer 2014). In the sensitive area of security, for instance, government authorities seek to 
demonstrate and reinforce their claim to sovereignty – closely linked to controlling the use of 
IRUFH:KLOHWRVRPHH[WHQWWKDWFDQEHZHOOMXVWLíHG4, it also prevents companies from providing 
PXFKQHHGHGWUDLQLQJIRUSROLFHRUPLOLWDU\LQDUHDVVXFKDVFRQîLFWSUHYHQWLRQDQGKXPDQ
rights (ibid.; Hönke 2013b). 
To conclude, while a certain degree of statehood may be still necessary to make MNC contribute 
to governance, statehood can also discourage or undermine their governance contributions. 
This raises the question of scope conditions. In the remaining part of this paper, we explore 
whether statehood is used for inciting companies to contribute more to governance, and less 
against the collective goods provision of non-state actors, if statehood is restrained (Börzel 
2010; Börzel, Thauer and Hönke 2013). 
4.2 Institutional restraints of statehood and alternative accountability mechanisms
Limited statehood refers to the capacity of states to set and enforce collectively binding rules 
on the provision of collective goods and services. Restrained statehood relates to the political 
4 See the research on private security actors and the commercialisation of security provision (e.g. Singh 
DQG.HPSD/HDQGHU
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willingness of actors to use such capacity for public purposes. State actors do not always 
act in the public interest, nor do they have to be intrinsically motivated to do so. Yet, liberal 
institutionalists have argued that the state monopoly of coercive power needs to be restrained 
and controlled to avoid excessive rent-seeking and non-universal allocation of public resources 
(Olson 1993; Fukuyama 2004; Zürn and Leibfried 2005). 
State actors have the authority to hierarchically impose common goods and services or 
command their provision by others. They are also endowed with privileged governance resources 
(Genschel/Zangl 2008: 4). Their public mandate commits them to use these resources in order 
to act in the public interest. In theory, this mandate also makes them politically accountable 
and legally liable in case of failure (Scharpf 1991: 630). Legal liability and political accountability 
are closely linked to the rule of law and democratic elections as the core institutional restraints 
RQ VWDWHKRRG 7KH íUVW FRQVWUDLQV WKH SRZHU RI WKH H[HFXWLYH E\ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG OHJDO
norms, rules and procedures that ensure that the provision of collective goods and services 
is transparent, impartial and predictable. The norms, rules and procedures are reviewed and 
enforced by an independent judiciary. While rule of law and democracy are closely associated, 
authoritarian regimes can bind themselves by the rule of law. Democracy, then, is more related 
to the second constraint on state power by institutions that ensure elite or party competition, 
XVXDOO\ LQHOHFWLRQV&LWL]HQVFDQYRWHWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWRXWRISRZHULI WKH\DUHGLVVDWLVíHG
with the provision of collective goods and services, particularly if they are presented with a 
political alternative (Gryzmala-Busse 2007).
Procedural approaches have focussed more on the quality of bureaucracy. The roots of bad state 
governance are too much discretion or too little autonomy of civil servants (Rauch and Evans 
.OLWJDDUG)ROORZLQJ:HEHUWKHLUPHULWEDVHGUHFUXLWPHQWDQGSURPRWLRQDUHWR
ensure the competence and independence of civil servants. New Public Management approaches 
emphasize market incentives to control the abuse of state power, such as the manipulation of 
wage scales, creating quasi-markets through a funder-provider split or contracting out, next to 
shortening accountability routes and increasing transparancy (Batley and Larbi 2004; Bräutigam 
DQG.QDFN+RZHYHUPHULWEDVHGUHFUXLWPHQWLVUDUHLQDUHDVRIOLPLWHGVWDWHKRRGDQG
SXEOLF VHFWRU UHIRUPRIWHQ UHPDLQV LQHìHFWLYH *ULQGOH  6FKLFN  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH
literature on bureaucratic practice and state-citizen relations in areas of limited statehood 
points to further limitations in the heuristic usefulness of that literature (Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan 2006; see also Gupta 1995).
Irrespective of whether they focus on the rule of law, democracy or the quality of bureaucracy, 
liberal approaches rely on formal instiutitons to restrain predatory state behavior or avert state 
FDSWXUH<HW IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHRIWHQ LQHìHFWLYH LQSUHYHQWLQJ WKHDEXVHRI VWDWHSRZHU
(Michael 2004, but also Migdal 1988; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). The post-communist states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the European Union in 2004 and score high on 
democracy and the rule of law, display serious problems of decoupling. Informal practices of 
corruption and clientelism prevail and undermine political competition and the distribution 
of power between executive and judiciary as prescribed by formal institutions (Innes 2013). 
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Moreover, several governments, including Hungary, the former poster child of post-communist 
transition, have introduced political and constitutional reforms that aim at curbing individual 
freedoms and the political control over government, such as the judiciary and the media 
6HGHOPHLHU  6SHQG]KDURYD DQG9DFKXGRYD 7KHZHDNHQLQJRI IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
creates further incentives for the ruling elite to seek rents and serve their narrow clientele 
rather than the general public.
While the governance literature has found that strong states correlate with strong societies 
(Börzel 2010),5 a more society-based conceptualization of restraints on statehood appears to be 
more appropriate for studying areas of limited statehood. We therefore understand by state 
restraint any political and social mechanism that circumscribes the possibility of state actors to 
invoke statehood, on the one hand, and that makes them justify their use of statehood in light 
of some public interest and face political and legal sanctions and/or a loss of legitimacy in case 
of abuse, on the other.
Liberal institutionalist approaches usually associate restraints on statehood with institutional 
FKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVRQJRYHUQPHQWVXFKDVHìHFWLYHUXOHRIODZDQGHOHFWLRQV7KH\DOVRUHIHUWR
an autonomous private or civic sphere, in which civil society and media operate independently 
from the state and hold government accountable, pressuring it to use statehood for collective 
JRRGVSURYLVLRQHJ3XWQDP7KHOLWHUDWXUHRQVRFLDOFDSLWDODQGFLYLFFXOWXUHLGHQWLíHV
four dimensions of such society-based restraints on statehood (cf. Rothstein 2011; Mungiu-
Pippidi 2013: 103-104): a prevailing social norm of ethical universalism (values), a general habit of 
engaging in collective action (social capital), a dense network of voluntary associations (civil society) 
and sustained participation and political engagement (civic culture). All four are interconnected 
and deemed necessary to prevent the abuse of state power.
Likewise, the International Relations literature has focused on how ‘activists beyond borders’ 
.HFNDQG6LNNLQNDQG1*2VGLUHFWO\DGGUHVV01&VLQRUGHUWRSHUVXDGHRUSUHVVXUH
them into more, and more inclusive, governance contributions (Spar and La Mur 2003; Yaziji 
DQG'RK'HLWHOKRì:ROI:KHWKHU VXFKPHFKDQLVPVKDYHEHHQDEOH WR UHVWUDLQ
VWDWHEHKDYLRUZKLFKLQWXUQZRXOGDìHFWWKHTXDOLW\RIFRPSDQLHVØJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQV
in areas of limited statehood, has remained largely unexplored. More importantly, only a few 
of these studies look at societal pressure that originates from the national or local, rather than 
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOOHYHO7KHVHVWXGLHVGLGQRWíQGVWURQJORFDOSUHVVXUHWKDW
resembled that kind of transnational activism (see e.g. Michael 2004; Tsai 2007). The inherent 
state-centrism in large parts of the governance literature is as limiting for our purpose of 
investigation as is the eurocentrism in the assumption of an autonomous private sphere distinct 
from politics. For instance, where central government does not enforce compliance with labour 
and human rights standards by companies, local communities might. Where central government 
defends a minimalist approach to corporate social responsibilities, communities often have 
5 Arguably, the literature rather refers to strong but democratically restraint states than strong 
authoritarian states.
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GLìHUHQWH[SHFWDWLRQV+¸QNHEDQGPLJKWLQFLWHORFDOSROLWLFLDQVWRSXWSUHVVXUHRQíUPV
to abide by these, even in the absence of NGOs. 
In this paper, we turn to the literature on postcolonial politics, informal institutions and 
resistance that highlights societal mechanisms that work at the local rather than at the national 
DQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOOHYHO$íUVWUHOHYDQWPHFKDQLVPLVWKHHPEHGGHGQHVVRIVWDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
in local social institutions that incorporate shared norms of public interest. Using comparative 
case studies of public goods provision in rural China, Lily Tsai (2007) has shown that state 
representatives that are embedded in inclusive societal institutions at the local level are more 
likely to strive for collective goods provision than those who are not embedded or in areas 
with no inclusive societal institutions. A similar mechanism can be at work in company-state-
community relations. Societies and communities often do have standards of what would be 
FRQVLGHUHGLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWHYHQZKHQVWDWHDFWRUVRYHUDOOPLJKWQRWUHîHFWDQGXSKROG
VXFKVWDQGDUGV6WURQJFRPPXQLW\LQVWLWXWLRQVFDQLQFLWHVWDWHRïFLDOVWRSXWSUHVVXUHRQD
company to contribute to collective goods and service provision. They may also prevent local 
RïFLDOVIURPSUHGDWRU\DSSURSULDWLRQRIFRPSDQ\SURJUDPV6RPHWLPHVVXFKSURJUDPVDUH
meant to be inclusive, but then end up being very restricted in scope because they get captured 
by authorities for rent-seeking. Inclusive societal institutions in which local authorities are 
embedded could prevent such appropriation. It has been suggested that this might be particularly 
the case in localities with high levels of community cohesion (Börzel and Risse 2010). 
Embeddedness in local social institutions bears some resemblance to concepts of social capital 
and civic culture. However, the concept is more focused on the conditions under which state 
representatives will be held accountable in the absence of formal institutions through which 
citizens could voice their claims. Trust is important, but it is personal rather than generalized 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2003). The social capital literature sees civil society organizations as a 
mechanism to convert such personal trust that emerged through face-to-face interaction into 
generalized trust among strangers (Putnam, 1993; Hooghe, 2003) – next to (state) institutions 
with coercive power (Levi, 1998; Levi, 2000). This is supposed to foster collective action while 
civic voice imposes checks and balances on state actors (e.g. Boix and Posner 1998). 
The concept of embeddedness in social institutions has two advantages over the literature 
on social capital and civic culture. First, both strong states and strong civil societies are 
largely absent in areas of limited statehood. So are formal institutions through which civic 
HQJDJHPHQW LQ WKH VRFLDO FDSLWDO VHQVHZRXOGEHDUXSRQSROLF\ RXWFRPHV:KDWZHGRíQG
LQVWHDGDUH VWURQJ ORFDO FRPPXQLWLHV IHDWXULQJVLJQLíFDQW OHYHOVRI VRFLDO WUXVWZKLFKJLYHV
rise to a collective understanding of what the collective good or interest should be. Second, 
embeddedness does not focus so much on how trust solves collective action problems within 
a group. Rather, it emphasizes how state and customary authorities can be held accountable 
by a collectivity. In other words, embeddedness stresses that more ‘civic’ collective action is 
QRWVXïFLHQWIRUKROGLQJRïFHKROGHUVDFFRXQWDEOHWRFROOHFWLYHJRRGVSURYLVLRQ7VDL
Hence, embeddedness in local social institutions does not measure the overall level of trust and 
civic engagement in an area. It is also less demanding, since it does not require the sharing of 
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universal values, political engagement or the existence of voluntary associations. Instead, the 
focus is on inclusive social institutions and their ability to embedd local state representatives 
(ibid.). If such institutions exist, and if authorities are part of them, we can expect them to be 
socialized into local expectations of collective goods and service provision. Societal institutions 
can award trust and esteem in return for engagement for inclusive governance, as well as provide 
social sanctions for not doing so. As we will see, local social institutions that have the ability to 
reward state and community representatives for attempts to improve governance can restrain 
statehood at the local level. 
It is important in this respect that state representatives that are dispatched from the national 
to the local level are less likely to be embedded in local social institutions. This would resonate 
with Catherine Boone’s model of „administrative usurpation“(Boone 2003). Non-inclusive 
social institutions, such as a lineage that only encompasses parts of a local community, can 
still embedd authorities; yet, they are likely to foster exclusive governance outcomes. The 
embedded authority would only be accountable to the members of the partial institution, 
not the entire community (the literature on clientelism and neopatrimonial networks tends 
to emphasis such cases, see e.g. Pitcher et. al. 2009; Meagher 2006: 554-6). One might assume 
that, in ethnically or religiously fragmented communities, strong collective institutions are less 
likely to be found. However, others have stressed societal institutions in fragmented societies, 
too. Granovetter drew attention to the relevance of weak ties (bridging capital, in Putnam’s 
terms) that reach across heterogenous groups. While more fragile, these ties have the potential 
to integrate heterogeneous societies. He has also emphasized the down side of strong ties in 
homogenous groups (bonding capital, in Putnam’s terms), as these are based on commonality, 
do not translate in general trust in society and risk reinforcing boundaries and excluding others 
(Granovetter 1985, Putnam 1995). It is, hence, an empirical question of whether comprehensive 
social institutions are in place and able to embed state representatives.
 
In many contexts though, such inclusive societal institutions are absent or fail to embed 
RïFLDOV)RUWKHVHFDVHVDQRWKHUIRUPRIVRFLHWDOUHVWUDLQWFDQEHLGHQWLíHG:HOORUJDQL]HG
subgroups at the local level may use direct pressure to restrain the ways in which local state 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV XVH VWDWHKRRG:H NQRZ WKDW VXFK ORFDO SUHVVXUH DGGUHVVHV íUPV GLUHFWO\
inciting them to engage in, and improve the quality of, governance contributions at the local 
OHYHOHJ)U\QDV+¸QNHDQG.UDQ]+¸QNHE6 Apart from reputational concerns, 
protest, such as blockades, marches and destruction of infrastructure, can be used to put direct 
SUHVVXUHRQíUPVWRFRQWULEXWHWRJRYHUQDQFHE\LPSRVLQJFRVWVWKURXJKVDERWDJHGHVWUXFWLRQ
of equipment and forced site closure. Such community protest can also address local state 
administration, demanding the use of statehood for improved collective goods provision such 
DVREVHUYHGLQ6RXWK$IULFDDQG*XLQHD,WPLJKWH[HUFLVHSUHVVXUHRQJRYHUQPHQWRïFLDOVWR
XVHVWDWHKRRGIRUSXWWLQJSUHVVXUHRQíUPVWRFXUEWKHLUQHJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHVDQGWRLPSURYH
6 Such pressure on companies has been proven particularly successful where communities are well-
FRQQHFWHGWRWUDQVQDWLRQDODGYRFDF\QHWZRUNVIRUWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVVHH.HFNDQG6LNNLQN%¸U]HO
DQG7KDXHU:HNQRZOHVVDERXWWKHHìHFWLYHQHVVRIORFDOSUHVVXUHLIQRWOLQNHGWRWUDQVQDWLRQDO
shaming advocacy. 
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local governance contributions, or prevent state actors from exclusive appropriation of company 
programs. 
Figure 4: Restraints on statehood
Institutional restraints: 
- legal: rule of law, separation of powers
- political: elections, party competition
Procedural restraints: 
- quality of bureaucracy
Societal restraints:
- direct societal pressure and civic culture 
- embeddedness in local societal institutions
7R VXP XS WKLV VHFWLRQ RI WKH SDSHU KDV LGHQWLíHG GLìHUHQW LQVWLWXWLRQDO SURFHGXUDO DQG
societal restraints on statehood. In principle, these restraints can work at all levels, global, 
transnational, national and local. Yet, in areas of limited statehood, (inter-)national courts or 
QDWLRQDOHOHFWLRQVDUHRIWHQEDUHO\HìHFWLYHLQKROGLQJORFDOVWDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDFFRXQWDEOH
Naming and shaming campaigns by (trans-)national civil society organizations tend to target 
companies directly rather than local authorities. For restraining the behavior of the latter, 
we therefore expect social restraints at the local level to be crucial. In the remainder of this 
SDSHUZHXVHREVHUYDWLRQV IURPFDVHV WKDWGLìHU LQ WKHTXDOLW\RIJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQV
by business in order to explore and illustrate our arguments. We focus on legal, political and 
societal restraints.
5. Mining companies and the quality of contributions to security governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
The broader project of which this paper is a part looks at companies in the mining sector in four 
GLìHUHQWFRXQWULHVWKDWYDU\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHRYHUDOOOLPLWDWLRQDQGUHVWUDLQWRIVWDWHKRRG
South Africa, Tanzania, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). With regards 
to the variation of these factors at the national level, South Africa is a case with relatively less 
limited and strongly restrained statehood in comparison to other African countries. Tanzania 
is characterized by a lower degree of limited and a moderate degree of formally restrained 
statehood. Guinea up until about 2006 is a case of an authoritarian regime hardly restrained by 
formal institutions in the use of statehood. At the same time, the government had the capacity 
to control the use of force and, where political will was given, some capacity to implement 
and enforce policies. Since the political transition in 2006/7, restraint has increased slightly, 
while state capacity has eroded. This puts Guinea in the same group of cases as the DRC: very 
limited statehood and, despite holding presidential elections since 2006, extremely weak legal 
and political checks and balances on the use of statehood. 
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Figure 5: Case selection
Statehood less limited more limited
more restrained South Africa Tanzania
less restrained Guinea (pre-2006) Guinea post-2006, DRC
)RU WKLV SDSHU ZH IRFXV RQ RQH RI RXU FDVH VWXGLHV 7DQ]DQLD 6LJQLíFDQW LQGXVWULDO JROG
production in Tanzania (re)started in the 1990s, and the Canadian company Barrick operates four 
GLìHUHQWFRQFHVVLRQVLQWKHFRXQWU\:HZLOOXVHWZRRIWKHVHLQWKH9LFWRULD/DNHUHJLRQZKLFK
despite being run by the same company in the same country and administrative subregion, 
show variation in the quality of company contributions to security governance. This keeps the 
limitation of statehood, as well as a whole range of other company and political system-related 
factors, constant and allows us to explore the relevance of local restraints. 
5.1 Restraint of statehood and business contributions to governance across countries
However, before turning to our case studies, we would like to begin with a brief assessment of the 
relationship between legal and political restraints of statehood at the national level and the quality 
RIORFDOJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVE\FRPSDQLHV:HíQGWKDWWKHOHYHORIQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDO
restraints as such does not systematically predict the quality of governance contributions by 
companies. No quantitative data is available on companies’ overall contributions to governance 
in a country. However, qualitative evidence shows certain tendencies that shall be used here for 
our discussion. 
First, let us consider the case of South Africa. The transition to universal democracy after 1990 
led to fundamental changes in what the government expected from mining companies in terms 
of contributions to collective service provision. The restraint of statehood increased when South 
Africa moved to universal elections. The African National Congress (ANC), representing the 
majority of the population, which had been formerly repressed and had had no access to political 
and legal mechanisms of restraint, gave the new government a mandate for redistribution of 
social wealth. Even though there was a backlash to more radical visions of redistribution, the 
new government set new rules for companies that obliged them to contribute more, and with 
more quality, to both local security and development in the mining areas (Bezuidenhuit and 
Hamann 2007). In response to political restraints, such as elections, and arguably the adoption 
of the rule of law based on human rights for all, the country achieved higher levels of mining 
sector contributions to local governance (Chabane et al. 2008; Hamann and Bezuidenhuit 2007).
 
However, if we consider business contributions to governance in South Africa during the 
apartheid era, the evidence stands in stark contrast to the post-1990 era and points to the 
limitations of formal political restraints. There was a democratic regime in place in South Africa 
at the time, but it was restricted to a minority and based on racial segregation. Most of those 
who worked in the mines under appalling conditions were not recognized as full citizens and 
6IWXVEMRXSJ7XEXILSSHERHXLI5YEPMX]SJ+SZIVRERGIF]1YPXMREXMSREP'SQTERMIWMR7YF7ELEVER%JVMGE`
had no right to vote – and therefore no way to hold the government accountable. There were 
DOVRQROHJDOPHFKDQLVPVWRZKLFK$IULFDQPLQHUVDQGWKHFRPPXQLWLHVVXìHULQJIURPWKH
QHJDWLYHHìHFWVRIWKHLQGXVWU\FRXOGKDYHWXUQHG7KHFDVHRI6RXWK$IULFDEHIRUHKHQFH
illustrates that the institutional checks and balances of a liberal democracy as such do not ensure 
public goods provision for the whole of a society. Statehood, and the political restraints thereof, 
was captured by a minority that then built it further up and used it for the suppression of a 
majority population. Despite democracy and a rule of law, there were no incentives for mining 
companies to improve working conditions, reduce violence and advance security practices or 
contribute to collective goods provision in communities adjacent to the mines. Accordingly, 
they did not do much.7
The case of the DRC, secondly, illustrates the opposite point, that is, despite very low legal and 
political restraints of statehood at the national level, a number of mining companies do make 
DWWHPSWVWRFRQWULEXWHWRJRYHUQDQFHHJ.RONDQG/HIRUW%¸U]HODQG+¸QNH)RU
LQVWDQFHODUJHULQGXVWULDOPLQLQJFRPSDQLHVLQ.DWDQJDSURYLQFHZHUHWKHíUVWWRDSSO\DQG
IXUWKHUGHYHORSWKH9ROXQWDU\3ULQFLSOHVRI6HFXULW\DQG+XPDQ5LJKWVWRDQXQSUHFHGHQWHG
GHJUHH7KH93VDUHDVWDQGDUGIRULPSURYLQJVHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFHDURXQGH[WUDFWLYHLQGXVWULHV
The degree of institutional restraints of statehood at the national level is hence a bad predictor 
for whether, and in what quality, companies will contribute to an inclusive provision of collective 
goods at the local level. Rather, transnational and local mechanisms of restraint are crucial to 
understanding variation in the quality of governance at the local level.
7RDFFRXQWIRUWKHVXEVWDQWLDOZLWKLQFRXQWU\YDULDWLRQZHíQGLWLVWKHUHIRUHQHFHVVDU\WRVFDOH
down to the local level and examine a broader range of mechanisms that restrain statehood. 
The societal restraints developed in the previous section allow us to see restraints where liberal 
institutionalists would not.
5.2 Local mechanisms of restraint and the quality of company contributions to 
governance: Gold mining in Tanzania8
We now turn to a case study of a gold mining company in Tanzania to explore to what extent 
mechanisms of restraining statehood existing at the local level add to a better quality of business 
FRQWULEXWLRQV WR JRYHUQDQFH :H FRQVLGHU GLìHUHQW RSHUDWLRQV RI WKH ODUJHU EUDQG QDPH
FRPSDQ\$IULFDQ%DUULFN*ROG $%*ERWKRIZKLFKDUH ORFDWHGLQWKHDUHDFORVHWR9LFWRULD
Lake. Company factors are therefore constant: Canadian company ABG is a global brand that is 
listed on international stock exchanges. It is faced with a vocal transnational shaming campaign, 
which targets major shareholder Barrick.9 The same is true for the limitation of statehood at the 
national level. While the administration of other sectors has been devolved to district level, the 
central government is in charge of all mining-related issues, including contract negotiations 
7 Some companies who sought to change were even stopped by the National Party government from 
doing so (Hönke and Thauer 2014).
 7KLVSDSHUGUDZVRQRQJRLQJTXDOLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIíHOGPDWHULDO:HZRXOGDSSUHFLDWHDQ\FRPPHQWV
and are keen to consider them in future project publications.  
9 http://protestbarrick.net/, last access 25.5.2013.
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and policy formulation and enforcement (Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 29). Yet state capacity to set 
and implement such regulation is limited.10 Nevertheless, governance contributions by ABG 
vary substantially in their quality; the quality of contributions to local security governance and 
development in Buzwagi is much better than those at the North Mara site of the same company. 
Variation in the quality of Barrick‘s contributions to governance: Buzwagi vs. North Mara
,QJHQHUDO FRPSDQLHV DUH VHHQDVQRW FRQWULEXWLQJRU DW OHDVWQRW FRQWULEXWLQJ VXïFLHQWO\
to improving local security and development in Tanzania. Instead, people emphasize the 
substantial new problems (negative externalities) they cause, such as reducing access to fertile 
land or depriving people from income from artisanal mining. Nevertheless, the Buzwagi 
DQG WKH1RUWK0DUD RSHUDWLRQV RI$%* DUH FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ GLìHUHQW TXDOLWLHV RI FRPSDQ\
contributions to local governance. 
$%*%X]ZDJLLVORFDWHGLQ.DKDPDGLVWULFW6KLQ\DQJDUHJLRQDQGLVRZQHGE\3DQJHD0LQHUDOV
Limited, a subisidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada. The mine started production 
during the second half of 2009. Since ABG should not have obtained a new mining development 
agreement (MDA), as the New Mining Act had not been voted on at that time, the Buzwagi mine 
ZDVQHYHURïFLDOO\LQDXJXUDWHG,WVRSHUDWLRQVDìHFWDWOHDVWWKUHHZDUGVLQWKH.DKDPDGLVWULFW
Mwime, Mwandakulima and Chapulwa. The mayority of the people living in these wards are 
both agriculturalists and livestock keepers. In contrast to the mine in Buzwagi, the North Mara 
mine consists of three open pit deposits located in the Tarime district, North Mara region. 
Production in the region began in 2002 under the ownership of Africa Mashariki Gold Mines 
(AMGM) and was later owned by Placer Dome before ABG bought it in 2007. People in this 
region used to depend on artisinal mining and cattle. 
As explained above, it is important to go beyond comparing gross contributions of a company 
WRORFDOJRYHUQDQFH9DULDWLRQLQWKHquality of governance contributions become clearer, when 
ORRNLQJ DW WKH LQFOXVLYHQHVV DQG LQGLUHFW HìHFWV RI FRQWULEXWLRQV DQG ZKHQ FRPSDULQJ WR
what extent contributions reduce or at least compensate for the negative externalities of core 
business operations. 
Inclusiveness
,QWHUPVRIJHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSHLQ%X]ZDJLDVPDOOHUDUHDLVDìHFWHGE\PLQLQJWKDQLQ1RUWK
Mara. In Buzwagi, three villages are located far away from the mine, while in North Mara seven 
villages are next to the pits. Service contributionsaddress the neighbouring communities as well 
as the district. The company contributes to hospital and school constructions or rennovations, 
water provision or infrastructure. However, in North Mara, many contributions date back to 
Barrick’s predecessor in the area, Placer Dome. Some of what had been put in place by Placer 
107KH:RUOG%DQNJRYHUQDQFHLQGLFDWRUVUDQNHGJRYHUQPHQWHìHFWLYHQHVVLQ7DQ]DQLDEHWZHHQ
-43.4 (out of 100) over the last 10 years. 
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Dome was allegedly stopped by ABG.11$WERWKVLWHV$%*LVGXHWRSD\Dí[HGDQQXDOUR\DOW\
payment of 200 000$ to the district. In North Mara, one per cent is supposed to be redistributed 
to villages that had once owned mining rights in the area and had entered into an agreement 
with Barrick’s predecessor over these royalty payments.12 In both localities, it is claimed that the 
money is disbursed equally between villages, according to a development plan or according to a 
scheme for the redistribution of the money to localities. Yet there is contradictory information 
on how much money is actually spent where, and on whom, especially in the North Mara case. 
In fact, in North Mara these payments had stopped in 2011 and it is unclear whether they have 
been taken up again since.13 Whereas ABG has not paid royalties in North Mara for a certain 
WLPHLQ%X]ZDJLWKHFRPSDQ\SD\VRQWRSRIWKHí[HGUR\DOW\VRPHPRQH\WRWKHYLOODJHKHDGV
as stipulated by a Memorandum of Understanding reached with local authorities.14 It has also 
been reported that they only hired people occasionally for smaller jobs like bringing or carring 
things15 or cleaning.16 
In the Buzwagi case, the social scope of ABG’s community engagement is generally more 
inclusive that in North Mara. This can be illustrated by the company’s local security program. 
ABG put in place a local security governance program in which every household, more precisely 
every male member of a household, is employed as a security guard. A rotation system is in place 
that allows everyone their turn. In addition, the company entered into a formal agreement with 
local authorities at ward level on employment opportunities for the local population, which 
EHQHíWVWKH\RXWK$%*DOVRFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHEXLOGLQJRIVFKRROVDQGWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRID
health center.17 Furthermore, people from both communities had to be relocated, but the people 
in Buzwagi were better compensated than the people in North Mara, where some villages were 
replaced totally and people did not get compensation at all. In Buzwagi, the company spent 
money to shift graves according to tradition.18 The same was not reported in North Mara. While 
there are complaints about the company’s contributions in both places, as these often did not 
meet people’s expectations, AGB does much better in Buzwagi than in North Mara. 
,QGLUHFWHìHFWVRIFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGQHJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHVRIFRUHEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHV
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ$%*ØVORFDOVHFXULW\SURJUDPVDUHFRPSDUHGLQUHJDUGWRWKHLULQGLUHFWHìHFWV
and in relation to the externalities of ABG’s core business practices in Buzwagi and North Mara.
11  FMR, 2012, p. 42.
12,QWHUYLHZ/*29703
13  NEMC (2011), p. 3. 
14,QWHUYLHZ9&K
15 ,QWHUYLHZ9&K
16  Interview LHRC 2.20
17  Interview DHRO 3.47, further interviews in Buzwagi area.
18  Interview CRO 2.34.
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In Buzwagi, a local security program was put in place by ABG, village authorities and Sungusungu, 
DORFDOV\VWHPRIMXVWLFHLQFOXGLQJYLOODJHOHYHOSROLFLQJ,WKDVKDGDSRVLWLYHHìHFWRQSXEOLF
security in the area. Interviewees in the region stated that crime rates dropped, which was linked 
to the inclusive integration of all households as vigilante guards for the company.19
On the contrary, in North Mara, violence and public insecurity actually increased in response to 
security measures taken by ABG. Like in Buzwagi, the mine in North Mara decided to cooperate 
with local villages and employ local guards, but this program has done less well than the one in 
%X]ZDJL)LUVWLWRQO\IRFXVHVRQEHHíQJXSVHFXULW\IRUWKHPLQLQJVLWH6HFRQGWKHSURJUDP
was not built on existing Sungusungu structures, which do exist in the area, but were bypassed. 
Instead, the company made a deal with local administration,20 which has not had any positive 
HìHFWVRQORFDOVHFXULW\DQGSROLFLQJ7KLUGWKHUHDUHLQDGGLWLRQPRUHQHJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHV
of other ABG security measures on public security in North Mara. In response to the problems 
ABG reported from the area, such as tresspassing by artisanal miners, the government declared 
the area a special police zone. As a consequence, more state security forces have been stationed 
WKHUH 7KH HìHFW RI WKLV LQLWLDWLYH RQ VHFXULW\ LQ QHLJKERXULQJ YLOODJHV KDV EHHQ QHJDWLYH
Incidents between the security guards and local people causing injuries happen regularly, and 
people complain about the arbitrary abuse of power by the police. A journalist of the newspaper 
The Citizen counted 70 deaths in three years from security issues since 2000 and about 24 
people wounded by security forces.21 
Overall, negative externalities are higher in North Mara because many people in the area used 
WROLYHIURPDUWLVDQDOPLQLQJ:LWKWKHDUULYDORILQGXVWULDOPLQLQJíUPVWKH\ORVWWKHLUPDLQ
source of income. For most of them, alternative sources of income are hardly available in this 
area. Five out of seven neighbouring villages previously held customary mining rights in the 
DUHD7KH RULJLQDO DJUHHPHQW WKH\ FRQFOXGHGZLWK 3ODFHU'RPH WKHíUVW LQGXVWULDOPLQLQJ
company on the concession, in the 1990s in order to compensate them for their loss of income. 
However, the agreement was never properly implemented.22 This is part of the reason why ABG 
JHWVD ORWRI LQWUXGHUVDQGFRQWHVWDWLRQLQWKHDUHD7KHORFDOSRSXODWLRQGHíHVWKHQHJDWLYH
H[WHUQDOLWLHVRI$%*ØVRSHUDWLRQVDQGWKHLQWKHLUH\HVLQVXïFLHQWFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHLUORVV
in income and livelihood. In 2009, when ABG set up operations in North Mara, a 2.9 million 
USD project to help artisanal miners in seven villages had been discussed. However, the project 
has not yet been realized.23:KLOHWKLVPLJKWFKDQJHZLWKQHZPDQDJHPHQWFRPLQJLQWRRïFH
in ABG, the important point here is that so far, ABG’s governance contributions fail to address 
the negative externalities caused by the company. Hence, they are of less quality than those in 
Buzwagi.
19  Interview Sun 3.53, Sun 3.55.
20,QWHUYLHZ9(2
21  Mosoba, Tom, 12.06.11, The Citizen.
22,QWHUYLHZV(2.(:
23'DLO\1HZV,QWHUYLHZ-28*29
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In sum, the quality of ABG’s contributions to security governance in the two regions varies 
VLJQLíFDQWO\ SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UHJDUG WR FRPSHQVDWLQJ IRU QHJDWLYH H[WHUQDOLWLHV ,Q %X]ZDJL
contributions matched the degree of negative externalities to an important extent. In terms 
RILQGLUHFWHìHFWVRIFRPSDQ\SURJUDPVWKHVHDUHODUJHO\SRVLWLYH7KHRSSRVLWHLVWKHFDVHLQ
1RUWK0DUD7KHQH[WVHFWLRQH[SORUHVWRZKDWH[WHQWGLìHULQJGHJUHVVRIUHVWUDLQWRIVWDWHKRRG
DFFRXQWIRUWKLVYDULDWLRQ$IWHUEULHî\FRQVLGHULQJWKHUROHRISROLWLFDODQGOHJDOUHVWUDLQWVZH
will focus on local societal restraints.
Weak legal and political restraints 
As data by the World Bank, Transparency International and the World Economic Forum show, 
OHJDO UHVWUDLQWV LQ7DQ]DQLD DUH UDWKHU ORZ &RQíGHQFH LQ WKH UXOH RI ODZ LV LQGLFDWHGZLWK
36%,24 and the country ranks at place 75 out of 142 with a score from 3.6/7 concerning judicial 
independence.25 )LHOGZRUN FRQíUPV WKDWSHRSOH LQPLQLQJ DUHDV WU\ WR IROORZDQGXVH OHJDO
procedures in order to make claims, and to get government to support these claims by writing 
letters to government representatives and launching formal complaints. However, these mostly 
go unheard and unanswered. 
As concerns political restraints, the “Bulyanhulu incident“ became a symbol of the problematic 
relationship between the local population, on the one hand, and multinational gold mining 
FRPSDQLHVDQGWKH7DQ]DQLDQJRYHUQPHQWRQWKHRWKHU:KHQRQHRIWKHíUVWIRUHLJQPLQLQJ
FRPSDQLHV ZDV WR WDNH XS LWV FRQFHVVLRQ LQ WKH9LFWRULD /DNH UHJLRQ LQ WKH V YLOODJHV
were relocated and thousands of artisanal miners were evicted without proper procedures. 
In the process, some 54 miners at Bulyanhulu died in mineshafts sealed by bulldozers. The 
government of Tanzania and the company were allegedly responsible.26 This was an exceptionally 
grave incident, which is still refered to by those opposing the government’s policy in favor of 
industrial mining in order to criticize the state’s readiness to enforce company interests with 
all means while lacking accountability to those who live in the mining areas. While the state’s 
FDSDFLWLHVDUHDUJXDEO\YHU\OLPLWHGDWWKHORFDOOHYHOWKRVHOLYLQJQH[WWRWKHPLQHVLQWKH9LFWRUD
/DNH UHJLRQ FRQíUP WKDW LQ WKHLU H[SHULHQFH VWDWH UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV GR OHVV WKDQ WKH\ FRXOG
to improve company contributions to local governance. The state is perceived as protecting 
249DOXHIURP7KLVGLPHQVLRQFDSWXUHVSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDJHQWVKDYHFRQíGHQFHLQ
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (Transparency International, 
Corruption per Country/Territory: Tanzania, http://www.transparency.org/country#TZA_DataResearch, 
last accessed on 13.02.2013.)
25 Judicial Independence is an indicator in the Global Competitiveness Index produced by the World 
Economic Forum. It measures the perceived extent in which the judiciary of the country is independent 
IURPLQîXHQFHVRIPHPEHUVRIJRYHUQPHQWFLWL]HQVRUíUPV6FRUHVUDQJHIURPKHDYLO\LQîXHQFHG
to 7 (entirely independent). Ibid.
26 See Tundu Lissu’s case study on Bulyuanhulu on the website of the Environmental Law Institute, 
KWWSZZZHOLRUJSGIDGYRFDF\WRROVFDVHVWXGLHVFDVHVWXG\WDQ]DQLDíQDOSGIODVWDFFHVVHG
also http://www.leat.or.tz/activities/buly.
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FRPSDQ\LQWHUHVWVíUVW27 Overall the position of the Tanzanian government is investor-friendly 
ÕLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK,0)DQG:%SROLFLHVÕDQGKDQGVRìZKHQLWFRPHVWRWD[HVDQGVRFLDO
obligations.28 Prevailant is a climate hostile to critique of government’s pro-industrial mining 
policies and of mining companies.
Despite this hostile climate and the dominance of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), a member of parliament (MP) managed to exploit formal institutions for restraining 
government and changing national mining policies.29 The MP, an adherent of the opposition 
party Chadema, made history with regards to mining policies in the country. In 2007, ABG 
signed a contract with the Tanzanian government over the Buzwagi mine, which was in the 
MP’s constituency, Shinyanga, despite the fact that the Tanzanian Mining Act was under review 
at the time and no new contracts were supposed to be made before its revision. When the MP 
learnt that a new mining deal was signed, he moved a private motion into the parliament. When 
the government tried to silence his contestation of mining policy by suspending him from 
his seat in parliament, he actively organized societal pressure in order to incite a revision of 
national mining policies.30 This is how he recalls the events:
“That suspension changed the whole political landscape in Tanzania, because 
Tanzanians were very furious, we organized demonstrations and rallies all over 
the country, in Dar es Salaam more than 200.000 people attended a rally that 
I addressed with other political leaders to condemn the decision of parliament 
to suspend me […]. So Buzwagi [the mine] became very popular, it became a 
catchword for all bad and poor contracts that the government has entered. And 
this precipitated into the president forming a mining review commission”.31
The presidential commission that was subsequently formed to review the old mining act, the 
Bomani commission, proposed that companies pay 3% royalties, out of which 20% should go 
GLUHFWO\WRWKHORFDOLW\ZKHUHWKHPLQHLVRSHUDWLQJ$QHZPLQLQJDFWZDVíQDOO\DGRSWHGE\WKH
government in 2010 and incorporated some reforms that had been proposed by the commission. 
27,QW&52&RQíUPHGE\,QWÚ7KH\>WKHOHDGHUV@UHDOL]HWKH\GRQRWZDQWWRLPSOHPHQWWKH
policies. […] I think leaders who supposed to administer this police, instead of bring that they go 
GRLQJIRUWKHPVHOYHVPD\EH,FDQVD\WKH\EHQHíWLQGLYLGXDOO\RWKHUWKDQFRPPXQLWLHV7KH\GRQRW
therefore implement, the majority there are people with their own interests.“ See also: Int.PWYP 1.7.
28 According to an activist on the mining issues, the mining companies do not pay their taxes and the 
JRYHUQPHQWGRHVQRWVDQFWLRQWKHPEHFDXVHLQGLYLGXDOVLQWKHVWDWHV\VWHPEHQHíWIURPFRUUXSWLRQ
practices. In the 2010 Mining Act, the royalties for gold are 4% of gross value (market value of minerals 
DWWKHSRLQWRIUHíQLQJRUVDOHRULQWKHFDVHRIFRQVXPSWLRQZLWKLQ7DQ]DQLDDWWKHSRLQWRIGHOLYHU\
within Tanzania), while in the 1998 Act, the royalties were 3% of net back value (the market value of 
minerals FOB at the point of export from Tanzania or, in the case of consumption within Tanzania, at 
the point of delivery within Tanzania).
297KHIROORZLQJWZRSDUDJUDSKVGUDZKHDYLO\RQD7DQ]DQLDíHOGUHSRUWSUHSDUHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI'
SFB700 by Esther Thomas.
30  Interview MoP 2.36.
31  Ibid. 
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However, other demands of societal actors from the mining areas, such as transparency issues, 
corporate social responsibility and retrocession of taxes, were not fully addressed by the new law. 
The case shows that, despite the overall restricted restraint of statehood, formal institutions such 
as the parliament sometimes can be invoked to change government policy in order to eventually 
DìHFWWKHTXDOLW\RIFRPSDQ\JRYHUQDQFH7KHFKDQJHVDFKLHYHGKRZHYHUZHUHOLPLWHGDQGLQ
the Buzwagi and North Mara mining areas, citizens still feel powerless and like they have no say 
in local and national policies. This limited say in local governance is related to the centralised 
character of the Tanzanian administrative system. State administration reaches down from the 
central state level to the mining localities; district commissioners, district executive directors and 
DOVRH[HFXWLYHRïFHUVDWZDUGDQGYLOODJHOHYHODUHDSSRLQWHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW7KHWRSGRZQ
SUHYDOHQFHRIWKHVWDWHPDNHVLWYHU\GLïFXOWIRULQIRUPDWLRQWUDYHOOLQJIURPWKHERWWRPXSWKH
lack of capacity, autonomy, but also will of government authorities to improve the situation 
for the local population, makes people feel neglected. In fact, according to Tideman and Msani 
(2011), decentralization has to some extent increased electoral and civic participation, brought 
down corruption, increased trust in local governments, improved service delivery, especially in 
HGXFDWLRQDQGDOORZHGJUHDWHUDFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQ+RZHYHURXULQWHUYLHZVLQWKH/DNH9LFWRULD
UHJLRQVXJJHVWWKDWORFDOFRXQFLOVWDìGRHVQRWWDNHORFDOSHRSOHØVFRQFHUQVHULRXVO\)XUWKHUPRUH
WKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWFDQRYHUUXOHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWFRQFHUQLQJWKHDOORFDWLRQRIVWDìDQGíVFDO
issues. Accordingly, the position of local-level elected councilors is weak overall. As Miniwasa and 
Shauri (2001: 23) state, “local authorities are nothing more than bureaucratic instruments for the 
central government and do not generate alternative values, preferences or aspirations”. 
Part of the reason for the lack of accountability of local state representatives to the local 
population in the mining areas is also the low to medium level of political restraint of statehood 
through elections and party competition. Tanzania shows low to medium-level rankings, with 
Freedom House Tanzania scoring 3 (out of 7) for political rights and civil liberty and Transparency 
International measuring 46% (out of 100) for voice and accountability. The political system 
remains highly centralized and largely controlled by the ruling party, a state which is referred to 
as ‘competitive hegemony’ (Morse 2013). Overall, democratic procedures have shown weakness, 
such as allegations of fraud during recent elections, to ensure CCM victory. CCM’s politics and 
JRYHUQPHQWDìDLUVDUHFORVHO\LQWHUOLQNHGZKLFKOLPLWVDFFRXQWDELOLW\RIPHPEHUVRISDUOLDPHQW
to the local constituency. The dominance of the ruling party in most local elections indicates 
that the state and the party have not yet fully separated at the local level. Furthermore, elected 
positions, such as district chairmen, village heads and ward councilors, are CCM and, due to 
an electoral system that requires nomination of candidates for local elections by the national 
leadership of political parties, have limited links to the local context.
However, it should be noted that, while the exception to the rule, opposition party Chadema has 
made inroads into government majorities in the mining areas. The October 2010 presidential 
and legislative elections were considered the most competitive and legitimate in Tanzania’s 
history. The opposition secured its largest representation in parliament, although CCM retained 
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a comfortable majority.32 The Chadema party’s vocal opposition to the government’s mining 
policies increased the politicization of the mining issue and helped to bring some local 
complaints about mining companies into the public arena. Chadema organizes meetings 
IRFXVLQJRQVSHFLíFGHYHORSPHQWVLQPLQLQJSROLF\FRUUXSWLRQDQGODFNRIODZHQIRUFHPHQW
vis-à-vis mining companies. The opposition party managed to mobilize local votes by criticizing 
the mines and teaming up with the local population33. As a result, criticism of mining companies 
got picked-up by electoral politics in some regions.34 
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that the problem is simply CCM and all state 
representatives from CCM lack accountability to local constituencies. Absence of political 
restraint of statehood through party competition does not seem to be overly relevant for 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH ODFN RI JRYHUQDQFH FRQWULEXWLRQV E\ PLQLQJ íUPV LQ WKH9LFWRULD /DNH
region. The structures built under TANU during the single party rule and villagisation still 
make people at the local level loyal CCM voters, and surveys repeatedly show huge support 
for CCM as well as negative perceptions of the opposition (Morse 2013). It is also not the case 
that only Chadema MPs criticize mining companies’ limited contributions to local governance. 
Local CCM representatives also speak out against mining companies and demand a new policy 
that commits them to more contributions to local governance. Therefore, neglection of local 
grievances and claims in our study areas is related to the capture of selected individuals within 
the local administration by the company, rather than central party politics and policies. This 
is supported by evidence that there are complaints about corruption in areas with CCM and 
Chadema representatives.35 In Geita district, for instance, it was reported that Chadema has 
won elections because they are more outspoken in regard to mining issues and ask for more 
contributions by companies to local governance. However, in Musoma district, Chadema lost 
votes over time because they did not deliver on their promises and got accused of corruption 
at the local level as well.36,QWHUYLHZHHVIURPORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVFRQíUPHGWKDWFRUUXSWLRQZDV
a problem across party representatives, and therefore not only a CCM problem.37 We conclude 
that party competition as such does not restrain the use of statehood by state representatives at 
the local level.
(PEHGGHGQHVVLQVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
As shown above, formal institutions of legal and political accountability have had only limited 
HìHFWRQ WKHTXDOLW\RI$%*ØVJRYHUQDQFH FRQWULEXWLRQV LQ7DQ]DQLD7KH UHPDLQGHURI WKLV
SDSHUH[SORUHVWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHYDULDWLRQLQTXDOLW\FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWRGLìHUHQFHVLQVRFLDO
32  Freedom House (2011), Freedom in the World: Tanzania, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2011/tanzania, last accessed on 14.05.2013.
33  Interview BUZ 2.33; OC 3.44. 
34  Press Review research project D2/SFB700; Interviews JOU2.1, NGO2.5, 2.10, 3.62; other interviews in 
Lake District. 
35  Int. POL 2.22.
36  Field research report Tanzania 2013 by Esther Thomas. 
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mechanisms of restraining statehood in the two localities.38 NGOs and the media lack autonomy 
DQGUHVRXUFHVWRHìHFWLYHO\PRELOL]HSXEOLFRSLQLRQDQGSXWSUHVVXUHRQJRYHUQPHQW0LFKDHO
2004, see also Dill 2011). The media, for example, picks up on mining issues, yet remains only 
semi-free.39 We therefore focus on local societal restraints. In the Buzwagi case, where ABG’s 
JRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVDUHPRUHLQFOXVLYHDQGKDYHSRVLWLYHVLGHHìHFWVZHGRLQGHHGíQG
strong social institutions at the local level in which the local state administration is embedded 
DQGZKLFKHìHFWLYHO\KROGORFDODXWKRULWLHVDFFRXQWDEOH%XLOGLQJRQWKHVHVWUXFWXUHVWKHORFDO
security governance program is better designed and implemented than in North Mara. 
The embeddedness of state representatives in the social institution of Sungusungu helps 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHGLìHUHQFHLQWKHTXDOLW\RIVHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFHLQ%X]ZDJLDVFRPSDUHGWR1RUWK
Mara. Sungusungu is legitimized by the state and incorporated into the formal judicial system, 
but has retained its own sanction mechanism (Paciotti and Mulder 2004). As one Sungusungu 
member described for Shinyanga, where the Buzwagi mine is located, they are hierarchically 
organized, consisting of a general secretary, a Chief Commander, a vice chair, a deputy secretary, 
a deputy commander and 15 councilors. Elections happen not on a regular basis, but only when 
faults are made by leaders.40,Q%X]ZDJLWKHYLOODJHH[HFXWLYHRïFHU6XQJXVXQJXOHDGHUVDQGWKH
ZDUGH[HFXWLYHRïFHURIWHQGLVFXVVLQPHHWLQJVDWWKHZDUGOHYHODQGKDYHDGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV
for discussing and implementing programs, such as the local security program, with ABG. 
Embedded in this structure, state representatives strived for programs with ABG that involve 
the majority of people who live in the area. They found a way to make each household 
EHQHíWIURPWKHVHFXULW\FRQWUDFWWKDW$%*FRQFOXGHGZLWKWKHPDQGWKHOHDGHUVRIWKHORFDO
Sungusungu system.41 As a result, the security program is not very centralized and coordinated 
DQG LPSOHPHQWHG E\ GLìHUHQW VWDNHKROGHUV Õ ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV FRPPXQLW\EDVHG SROLFLQJ
agents, companies and state police, increasing compliance with the program goals. This case 
illustrates that societal institutions in which politicians and state administrators are embedded 
FRPPLWRïFLDOVWRVWULYHIRULQFOXVLYHJRYHUQDQFHFRQWULEXWLRQVE\FRPSDQLHV,WSUHYHQWVORFDO
authorities from seeking rents and capturing the program for an exlusive clientele.
 
The case also provides evidence, however, that local social institutions are less successful in 
overcoming the general divide between central state and national and provincial admininstation, 
on the one hand, and the local population, local elected authorities and to some extent local 
administration, on the other. Local government remains generally powerless, and complaints at 
the district level are often ignored.42 Overall, people in Buzwagi stated that they did not see how 
38)RUKRZFRUSRUDWHFXOWXUHPLJKWDFFRXQWIRUWKHFRQîLFWLYHQHVVRIFRPSDQ\FRPPXQLW\UHODWLRQVLQ
North Mara, see Thomas forthcoming.
39 Freedom House (2012), Freedom of the Press 2012: Tanzania, http://www.refworld.org/docid/50e161291.
html, last accessed on 02.05.2013.
40  Ibid.
41 Interview Sung 3.53, other interviews.
42,QWHUYLHZ9&0
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they could sanction government for not answering to the needs of local constituencies and for 
not using statehood for improving local governance.43 
In the case of North Mara, the lack of embeddedness of state representatives in societal institutions 
at the local level accounts to an important extent for the low quality of ABG’s governance 
contributions in the area. A local Sungusungu security structure can be found in North Mara 
as well. However, state representatives, such as those in village and district administration, are 
not embedded in such local, societal institutions. This is not only the case for Sungusungu; it 
also pertains to other societal structures in place in local communities, which mostly identify 
as Wakurya. Relations between ABG and state administration on the one hand, and local 
SRSXODWLRQRQ WKHRWKHUKDQG DUH YHU\ FRQîLFWLYH DQG YLROHQW FRQIURQWDWLRQEHWZHHQPLQH
security forces, state police and local communities are frequent.44 
The societal institutions in place are largely separate from local state institutions. For instance, 
the local Sungusungu structure is not involved at all in the management of the security contract 
between ABG and village authorities.45 The embeddedness of local state authorities, appointed 
as well as elected, is very low to nonexistent. Thus, the social institutions in place are not able 
to embed and thereby restrain how local administrators use statehood. At the same time, the 
central state dominates interactions with the company. Until 2011, ABG North Mara only 
interacted directly with the District Commissioner, whereas in Buzwagi more consultations 
with local state representatives and village authorities took place. The regional and national 
state authorities did not involve local elected representatives and the local population more 
broadly.46 Some go as far as to claim that local representatives up to the district level have 
allegedly been put in place with the help of ABG.47 Opposition leaders in particular suspect the 
FRPSDQ\RIíQDQFLQJSROLWLFDOFDPSDLJQVLQRUGHUWRKDYHORFDODXWKRULWLHVRQWKHLUVLGHWR
calm tensions. 48 
Overall, local government is perceived as having no autonomy from, nor leverage power vis-
à-vis, the central government.49 Not only is mining largely administered from Dar-es-Salaam 
– which to some extent is similar in Buzwagi, even though central state representatives there 
are better embedded in local societal institutions and interact more with these – but security 
is as well. In response to company concerns, the area around ABG’s mine in North Mara was 
declared a special security zone, with the result that more state police and special security forces 
have been put in place here than in Buzwagi. At the same time, the local security program by 
ABG in North Mara bypasses communal security structures like the Sungusungu. 
43,QWHUYLHZ9&0RWKHULQWHUYLHZVLQDUHD
44  Field research report Tanzania 2013 by Esther Thomas; also Thomas forthcoming.
45  Interview Sung 3.36.
46  Ibid., also interviews JOU 2.18, 2.19.
47  Interview NGO 1.24; see also Hönke, with Thomas (2012).
48  Interview POL 2.22.
49,QWHUYLHZV9,/FRQYHUVDWLRQVLQORFDODUHD
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7KHVHDUHSUHOLPLQDU\íQGLQJV+RZHYHUWKH\VXJJHVWWKDWWKHODFNRIHPEHGGHGQHVVRIVWDWH
representatives in North Mara in local societal institutions contributes to understanding the 
the the low quality of ABG’s local security governance program. A narrow coalition of the local 
management of ABG and unembedded political authorities produces exclusive local governance 
(see also Hönke, with Thomas, 2012). 
'LUHFWFRPPXQLW\SUHVVXUH
3HRSOH RIWHQPRELOL]H WR SXW GLUHFW SUHVVXUH RQ íUPV RU ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV LQ RUGHU WR JDLQ
collective goods. The case of North Mara provides disturbing results with regards to this 
alternative mechanism of societal restraint. High levels of protest and violent collective action 
KDYHQRWUHVXOWHGLQDFKDQJHLQEHKDYLRURIVWDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVQRULQVLJQLíFDQWHQJDJHPHQW
by ABG to compensate for the loss of income for thousands of artisanal miners in the area 
or work towards sustainable alternative sources of income. The local population frequently 
invades the concession and has attacked the mining compound. However, community pressure 
failed to improve the quality of ABG’s governance contributions (Thomas forthcoming). On 
the contrary, relations between state police, private security and local people degraded, further 
increasing levels of insecurity for the local population. Local people have little trust in the 
police and react aggressively.50
More cross-case analysis is necessary in order to reveal under which conditions community 
pressure can be successful in restraining statehood and inciting more governance contributions 
by companies. Confrontative mobilization might often be an indicator for a situation with 
closed institutional opportunity structures (McAdam et. al. 1997), which suggests that violence 
might be the only option for local claim making in a situation with low likelyhood of successful 
goal attainment.
Conclusion
This paper addressed the question of whether and with what degree of quality companies 
FRQWULEXWHWRORFDOJRYHUQDQFHLQDUHDVRIOLPLWHGVWDWHKRRG'LVWLQJXLVKLQJGLìHUHQWTXDOLWLHV
of business contributions, we explored to what extent variation in quality depends on the 
limitation, and more importantly, on the restraint of statehood. We have argued that degrees 
of limited statehood cannot account for the variation in the quality of business contributions 
we observed. Rather, restraint of statehood is a key explanatory factor. It provides an important 
scope condition under which statehood is used more for improving company contributions to 
governance, and less against the provision of collective goods and services by non-state actors.
50 Some argue that people in North Mara were more aggressive than others. However, this representation 
RIWKH:DNXU\DLQWKHPHGLDDQGSRSXODUGLVFRXUVHLVEHWWHUWKRXJKWRIDVDQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHVSHFLíF
incidents and history of the area than the cause behind confrontations between local population and 
$%* ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKLV LV D ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG WUDQVORFDO QDUUDWLYH DFURVVPLQLQJ DUHDV LQ GLìHUHQW
states, artisanal miners and labor migrants use to be depicted by others as violent outcasts (see e.g. 
Werthmann 2009).
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In addition to institutional restraints drawn from liberal state and democratic theory, such as the 
rule of law, democratic elections and autonomous civil society groups, we introduced societal 
mechanisms of restraining statehood at the local level. We have shown that formal mechanisms 
RIUHVWUDLQWDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOVXFKDVHOHFWLRQVDQGWKHUXOHRIODZDUHGLïFXOWWROLQNWR
the quality of non-state governance. In areas of limited statehood, they are empirically not the 
most relevant mechanisms either. Instead, we have developed a broader concept of restraints 
that goes beyond liberal institutionalism and takes local societal restraints into account, namely 
the embeddedness of authorities in local societal institutions and community pressure. Where 
formal restraints are not in place, dysfunctional or weak, such local social mechanisms can be 
crucial in holding state authorities – and companies – accountable to the public good. Our case 
studies from gold mining in Tanzania, which features medium-levels of limited and formally 
restrained statehood, have shown that the quality of governance by companies improves if local 
authorities are embedded in strong social institutions. Where there are such institutions, but 
authorities are disconnected from them, the opposite outcome has been found. Even high levels 
RIFRPPXQLW\SUHVVXUHUHPDLQHGLQHìHFWLYHLQWKLVFDVH
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